Jorge de Mendonça, a specialist in transport policy and planning with the Asociación Intermodal de América del Sur (AIMAS), has issued a pointed warning about the potential consequences of an Open Access railway model. In a recent note, he cautioned that such an approach would “leave out almost the totality,” a phrase that signals significant exclusionary effects even as the precise scope of those excluded is not detailed in the available excerpt. Framed against the backdrop of port competitiveness and inland connectivity, his message is unambiguous: rail policy design is not an abstract exercise; it is a determinant of how efficiently cargo reaches quays, how predictably services run, and how costs propagate across supply chains.
What the warning means for ports
For Argentine ports, the stakes are practical and immediate. If a market structure or access regime constrains who can run trains, under what conditions, and with what incentives, the consequences ripple to terminals, barge and ocean schedules, and exporters’ margins. Port managers often rely on rail to aggregate volumes from dispersed production zones. If critical shippers or operators are disadvantaged or excluded by the access rules, bottlenecks can shift inland, dwell times can rise, and throughput can fall. De Mendonça’s alert, therefore, reads as a caution against reforms that could unintentionally thin the ecosystem of rail service providers or reduce contestability on key corridors.
“Open access” in rail typically refers to a regime in which multiple licensed train operators may run services over shared infrastructure, subject to capacity allocation and track access charges governed by an infrastructure manager or regulator. The exact design varies widely by country. Well‑calibrated frameworks can broaden competition and service options; poorly calibrated ones can entrench incumbency, fragment responsibilities, or introduce coordination failures. The warning flagged by AIMAS underscores that rules on paths, tariffs, interoperability, and investment recovery are not technicalities. They decide who can viably enter, remain, or expand in the market—and, by extension, whose cargo moves efficiently to port.
The original Spanish headline situates this debate within a proposal labeled the Modelo 5F, presented as a potential driver of maritime and fluvial transport. While the excerpt does not elaborate on that model’s specific content, the framing suggests a rail‑centric approach intended to strengthen river and sea logistics. In such a context, policy coherence becomes essential: the objectives of any 5F‑type program will hinge on whether rail access, capacity planning, and terminal interfaces allow cargo to flow predictably from inland origins to vessels without costly transshipment or administrative friction.
Key operational questions inevitably follow. How will capacity be allocated at peak periods, and who arbitrates conflicts between operators with overlapping time‑sensitive commitments? What is the structure of track access charges, and do they encourage efficient asset use without penalizing new entrants? Are first‑ and last‑mile links into port terminals—often the weakest links—funded, signaled, and staffed to handle higher volumes? Will rolling stock standards and data protocols be harmonized to prevent avoidable delays? And can intermodal terminals be sited and scaled to aggregate cargo at competitive costs while minimizing road congestion near ports?
There is also a governance dimension. Effective open access depends on transparent slot allocation, credible dispute resolution, and a regulator capable of monitoring performance and enforcing non‑discrimination. If these elements are under‑specified, operators may price in risk, reducing service frequency or coverage. Conversely, if responsibilities are overly fragmented, accountability can blur just when reliability is most needed to meet vessel cut‑offs. Ensuring that tariff design supports reinvestment in rail corridors—tracks, yards, signaling—matters as much as the headline promise of “open” markets.
De Mendonça’s caution thus lands as a call for technical clarity before reform. The claims in the excerpted note are narrow but consequential: a warning that certain designs could “leave out” many. Without further published detail, stakeholders will look for the full proposal and its impact assessments: who gains access under what conditions, what protections exist for shippers reliant on essential services, and how continuity will be secured during any transition. Until those answers are explicit, port authorities, carriers, and exporters are likely to reserve judgment—and press for a rail access regime that safeguards capacity, contestability, and service reliability across maritime and river supply chains.
